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A B S T R A C T
The article explores issues about governing domestic cap-and-trade systems for mitigating carbon emissions. The
implementation of these systems in China warrants investigation, because they could restructure the governing
relationships between public and private actors and create conditions for networked forms of governance. The
study identiﬁes key challenges presented by an emerging network supporting carbon market development in
Guangdong. It provides an assessment of network functioning in terms of capacity building, actor engagement,
and rule setting and implementation. The research is based on semi-structured interviews with non-state net-
work constituents, coupled with a review of policy development. We ﬁnd that this emerging network has de-
monstrated some of the key network functions, mainly capacity building, and can be seen as a partial substitute
for the state in this area. However, more could be done to strengthen participation and enable power sharing in
steering and coordinating the decision-making process. The key features of reﬂexivity and power sharing in
decision-making and steering are not clearly represented, leading to a conclusion that this governance network
remains underdeveloped. This article contributes to the debates on the contested role of cap-and-trade systems in
displacing hierarchical approaches and empowering a wider range of actors.
1. Introduction
Governance can be deﬁned as an assemblage of actors and institu-
tions that operates across state and non-state, public and private do-
mains, and is embedded in concrete practice and achieved through
practical means that order and regulate activities towards particular
objectives (Bulkeley et al., 2016). During the past two decades, the
governance of climate change has ascended to new heights in scholarly
debates, particularly on policy-relevant topics such as interstate nego-
tiations (Pattberg and Stripple, 2008), the formation and dynamics of
public-private partnerships (Bäckstrand, 2008), and multi-level gov-
ernance (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003; Schreurs, 2017). A converging
perspective is that non-state actors and networks play an increasingly
important role in the climate governing regimes (Andonova et al., 2009;
Bulkeley, 2005; Pattberg and Stripple, 2008; Tosun and Schoenefeld,
2017).
In the climate change arena, governance takes place in manifold
ways and the locus of authority varies. Pattberg (2010) suggests that
networks are a more advanced mode of steering towards governance
objectives than hierarchical and market-based ones. Most governing
regimes involve elements of two or more governance modes and tend to
move towards the non-hierarchical ones, as an increasing number of
civil society and business actors are brought into the system. These
tendencies are particularly evident in transitioning political or gov-
erning systems that experiment a certain form of institutional or policy
innovation, such as emission trading (Schröder, 2011; Lo and Spash,
2012; Paterson et al., 2014). The pilot emission trading schemes (ETS)
of China represent such an innovation. There are, however, remarkable
tensions in policy practice and expectation between state and non-state
actors (Chen and Lees, 2016; Shen, 2015, 2017).
China has introduced new policy instruments to strengthen its ef-
forts on greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation. The past ten years have seen
its climate policy preference shifting from the conventional ‘command-
and-control’ instruments towards a market-based ones (Cong and Lo,
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2017; He et al., 2012; Pei et al., 2013; Schröder, 2011; Zhang, 2015a,
b). The implementation of ETSs in eight provinces and municipalities of
China from 2013 marked a watershed in the history of Chinese climate
policy. These schemes attempt to lay a foundation for a nationwide
scheme. Indicative estimates provided by the World Bank (2016, p. 22)
suggest that if a national ETS is implemented in China, global GHG
emissions covered by carbon pricing initiatives will rise from 13 per
cent to 20 to 25 per cent. The ways in which these pilot schemes - and
the carbon markets arising from them - are governed and their out-
comes will have signiﬁcant implications for national policy develop-
ment in China as well as the future of the global carbon economy.
This paper aims to ascertain what governance challenges the de-
velopment of carbon markets in China present. Many ETSs are ‘cap-and-
trade’ systems, which require a legitimate entity, typically an author-
ized government agency, to set up and enforce binding emission re-
duction targets. ETSs also enable business and market actors to re-
present their interests through carbon markets and their governing
bodies, which are more inclusive and ﬂexible. The interwoven linkages
and interactions between the public and private domains create a
polycentric networked system by which climate change and energy is-
sues are negotiated (Newell and Paterson, 2010; Paterson et al., 2014).
The networks that play a crucial role in the delivery of Chinese ETSs are
likely to be diﬀerent from those of mature market economies that are
set up by coalitions of state and non-state actors. Although climate
governance in China appears to be steered toward a market- or even a
network-based approach (Mai and Francesch-Huidobro, 2015;
Schreurs, 2017; Shen, 2017) and local governments assume a greater
role (Lo and Francesch‐Huidobro, 2017; Lo, 2015b), primary political
authority rests upon the authoritarian state (Chen and Lees, 2016;
Gilley, 2012). The intriguing combination of decentralizing and top-
down practices creates mixed opportunities for policy innovation and
implementation, which are relatively less evident in established liberal
market economies operating an ETS.
This paper focuses on one of the emerging networks that support the
Guangdong ETS and related activities in the Province. We assess its
performance in terms of three network functions, namely, capacity
building, actor engagement, and rule setting and implementation. A
series of in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted in
Guangzhou, the capital city of Guangdong, to record network con-
stituents’ ﬁrst-hand experiences in dealing with relevant government
agencies and policy initiatives. Before introducing their roles and de-
scribing the policy background, the next section further elaborates on
the key elements of network governance informing our analysis.
2. Key functions of governance networks
Network governance can be understood as a particular process of
collective decision making, steering, and coordination (Parker, 2007;
Robins et al., 2011; Secco et al., 2017). It “requires the state to steer
society in new ways through the development of complex networks and
the rise of more bottom-up approaches to decision making” (Stoker,
2006, p. 41). These networks enable and coordinate a more decen-
tralized and pluralistic decision-making process, allowing a wider range
of participants, especially non-state actors, to be seen as legitimate
members of the decision-making process in the context of considerable
uncertainty and complexity (Robins et al., 2011; Stoker, 2006). Key
non-state actors brought into these networks include corporations, civil
society organizations, and research institutes and think tanks. The de-
centralizing and pluralistic tendencies engender multiple loci of gov-
ernance; examples have been found in the diﬀusion of carbon emission
trading systems, which demonstrates a polycentric model involving
both public and private actors (Paterson et al., 2014).
The rise of network governance represents a shift from hierarchical
to non-hierarchical ways of governing. In the climate change arena, the
capacity of individual and collective actors to change the course of
events or the outcome of processes is increasingly located in sites
beyond the state, and many of them “deliberately form social institu-
tions to address the problem of climate change without being forced,
persuaded or funded by states and other public agencies” (Pattberg and
Stripple, 2008, p. 374). As Bäckstrand (2008) argues, networks are
emblematic of the continuing transition from “government” to “gov-
ernance”, displacing top-down modes of steering and traditional reg-
ulation (see also Kooiman, 2003; Rhodes, 1996). In pursuing a collec-
tive decision, networks promote a sense of shared ownership and an
awareness of mutual inﬂuence (Parker, 2007), and enable a process of
social learning among state and non-state actors (Tosun and
Schoenefeld, 2017). The network process should also demonstrate re-
ﬂexive rationality, which requires a continual commitment to dialogue
to generate and exchange information, reﬂections on practice and
worldviews, and institutionalized negotiations to mobilize consensus
and build mutual understanding (Jessop, 1998, 2002).
In practice, however, governance networks diﬀer in their power
structure and role. Pattberg (2010), for instance, ﬁnds that many
public-private partnerships that emerged from the 2002 Johannesburg
World Summit on Sustainable Development are dominated by state
actors in terms of leadership and general membership. Market-based
systems, such as those governing the carbon markets, are found to be
driven by business-led coalitions along with state institutions (Newell
and Paterson, 2010). Furthermore, not all networks function as a de-
cision-making and coordinating entity; some of them act as a net-
working hub only and their role is limited to providing training and
mentoring services to its members, failing to bring all relevant actors
into policy development (Parker, 2007). The mere transmission of ac-
tion-enabling expertise enables a cognitive form of engagement that
emphasizes information and knowledge diﬀusion, but not necessarily
critical reﬂections and negotiations. Thus, the quality of a governance
network depends on, among other factors, the type of actors with pri-
mary responsibilities for establishing and managing a governance net-
work, and the role of this network. These two dimensions characterize
Andonova et al. (2009) typology of climate change governance net-
works.
The ﬁrst dimension, i.e. the type of actors, concerns how the au-
thority of governance is established and maintained. Andonova et al.
(2009) have identiﬁed three types of networks based on actors in-
volved. Public networks involve actors such as state agencies, legisla-
tors, and intergovernmental organizations, whereas private networks
involve a wide range of actors, who broadly include businesses, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and other non-state actors. Hybrid
forms of networks involve collaboration between public and private
actors. Most ‘cap-and-trade’ systems, such as the European Union ETS
and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), involve public
governance networks in which authority rests upon governments or
intergovernmental institutions (Andonova et al., 2009).
The second dimension concerns the governance functions provided
by the network and speciﬁes the means through which networks steer
their constituents. The three functional categories derived by Andonova
et al. (2009) include 1) information-sharing (producing and diﬀusing
knowledge), 2) capacity building and implementation (providing re-
sources to enable action), and 3) rule-setting (establishing rules intended
to guide and constrain constituents). Diﬀerent networks have their own
functional priorities and strengths, and some of them are particularly
poor in achieving one or more of these goals, indicating a network
failure. This dimension of network is useful for understanding how
networks are clustered and perform, and more fundamentally, whether
they can be regarded a functioning governance network.
We adapt this analytic account to a study of an emerging public gov-
ernance network in Guangdong. This loosely structured network supports
the implementation of a market mechanism (i.e. ETS) in various ways and
has shown some potential for demonstrating the three network functions
mentioned above. This basic framework is used to ascertain the extent to
which, and in what aspects, the public network supporting GHG emission
reduction activities in Guangdong has performed its key functions. Our
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study design was informed by Andonova et al. (2009) analytic account.1
Nevertheless, we modiﬁed elements of this framework when describing
our case study for reasons explained below.
3. Methodology
3.1. The case study
In 2011, the Chinese central government formally appointed two
provinces (Guangdong and Hubei) and ﬁve municipalities (Beijing,
Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, and Shenzhen) to run trial ETSs. Located on
the South China Sea and including the Pearl River Delta, one of three vast
urban agglomerations in China, Guangdong is a highly urbanized and
industrialized province with a total population of over 108 million in 2015
and a total GDP of USD1124.2 billion in 2015. (Table 1). Guangdong’s per
capita GDP was USD 10,422 in 2015, putting it at the eighth nationally.
Being the largest single economy within China, Guangdong Province is
home to nearly all kinds of industries, including some world leading ones
(e.g. electronics, machinery and petrochemicals). The Province has re-
corded a relatively high level of GHG emissions because it remains
dominated by the manufacturing sector, which is highly emission-in-
tensive. In 2012, Guangdong generated a total of 610.5 million tonnes of
carbon-equivalent emissions, which is about 5.6 per cent of the country’s
total2.
Guangdong oﬃcially launched its ETS in December 2013, meaning
that the system for regulation and trading was set up around two years
after the central government mandated the pilot ETSs in October 2011.
The Guangdong ETS has not yet been given a formal legislative basis.
Instead, the political legitimacy of this scheme is given by the People’s
Government of Guangdong Province through a formal administrative
document titled the ‘Notice on Publishing the Implementing Plan for
Carbon Allowance Trading Pilot of Guangdong’ released in September
2012 (People’s Government of Guangdong Province, 2012). The
Guangdong Government, subsequently, made public the operational
requirements and rules of the ETS by issuing a decree titled ‘Trial
Methods of Emission Management of Guangdong’ in 15 January 2014 -
one month after the ETS came into force (People’s Government of
Guangdong Province, 2014).
According to the Guangdong Government, the Guangdong ETS
covers 244 existing polluting entities (Table 1). In 2014 and 2015, a
total of 408 million tonnes of CO2 emission allowances were issued,
and tightened to 386 million in 2016, making the world’s third largest
carbon market after the European Union and South Korea. The alloca-
tion subsequently rose to 422 million when two new sectors, Pulp and
paper and Aviation, were brought into the scheme. The volume of al-
lowance auction and market trading exceeded 24 million tonnes, and a
turnover of 1.0 billion yuan was recorded. By the middle of 2017, these
ﬁgures increased to 62.8 million tonnes and 1.48 billion yuan (approx.
223 million USD), respectively, exceeding all other pilot ETSs in China
(Figs. 1 and 2). Thus, Guangdong accounts for more than one-third of
the national market share, in which a total volume of 183.3 million
tonnes CO2 at the value of 638.7 million USD has been traded since the
inception of the ETS. Allowance prices, however, stand at a relatively
low level. In October 2017, emission allowances issued by Guangdong
were sold at about US$2.14 per tCO2e, lower than those under other
Table 1
Key features of Guangdong Province and Guangdong Emission Trading Scheme (ETS).
Guangdong Province
Total Population (2015) (percentage of country)a 108 million (7.9%)
GDP (2015) (percentage of country)a USD 1124.2billion (10.7%)
GDP per capitaa USD 10,422
Overall GHG emissions (excluding LULUCF) (2012)
(percentage of country)b
610.5 MtC02e (5.6 %)
Guangdong ETS
Launch date 19 December 2013
Percentage of GHG emissions covered by the ETSb 60%
Cap on GHG emissions (2016)c 422 MtCO2e
Sectors coveredc Electricity generation, Iron and steel, Cement, Petrochemicals, Pulp and paper and Aviation
Number of liable entitiesc 244 existing enterprises (2016)
Inclusion thresholdsd 20,000t CO2/year or energy consumption 10,000 tons coal equivalent (tce)/year.
Allowance allocationd Electricity generation sector: 95% free allocation, 5% auction Iron and steel, cement, petrochemicals sectors: 97%
free allocation, 3% auction
Trading mode Spot trading, block trades, negotiated transfers
Banking and borrowing of allowancese Banking is allowed during the pilot phase. Borrowing not allowed.
Oﬀsets and creditse Domestic project-based carbon oﬀset credits — China Certiﬁed Emission Reduction (CCER) — are allowed. The use
of CCER credits is limited to 10% of the annual compliance obligation. At least 70% of CCERs need to come from
Guangdong. Pre-CDM credits are not eligible as are credits from hydropower and most fossil fuel projects.
Sources:
a National Bureau of Statistics of China (data.stats.gov.cn). The GDP estimates originally in Chinese yuan were converted to US dollars at the rate of 6.4778 (USD/
CNY) based on the Federal Reverse’s exchange rate records (31 December 2015).
b International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) (icapcarbonaction.com). Accessed 23 August 2017.
c Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (2017). Notice on the Allocation of Carbon Emission Allowances of Pulp and paper, Aviation and White
Cement in Guangdong Province 2016. Guangzhou: People’s Government of Guangdong Province, People’s Republic of China. Available at http://www.cnemission.
com/article/news/ssdt/201701/20170100001201.shtml [in Chinese]. Accessed 23 August 2017.
d Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (2016). Notice on the Allocation of Carbon Emission Allowances in Guangdong Province 2016. Guangzhou:
People’s Government of Guangdong Province, People’s Republic of China. Available at http://dtfz.ccchina.gov.cn/archiver/LowCD/UpFile/Files/Default/
20160714093558793864.pdf [in Chinese]. Accessed 23 August 2017.
e People’s Government of Guangdong Province (2014). Trial Methods of Emission Management of Guangdong (No. 197, Decree of Guangdong Provincial Gov-
ernment). Guangzhou: People’s Government of Guangdong Province, People’s Republic of China. Available at http://zwgk.gd.gov.cn/006939748/201401/
t20140117_462131.html [in Chinese]. Accessed 23 August 2017.
1 Our analysis does not deeply engage with the ﬁrst dimension of governance network
described by Andonova et al. (2009), because authority clearly falls onto the state’s hands
and the network is primarily a public one. Instead, we seek evidence from the experience
of actors who contribute to network functioning.
2 The 2012 estimate on Guangdong’s GHG emissions is the latest one we can ﬁnd, due
to the lack of transparency in data reporting.
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similar schemes, including the Beijing, Shanghai, Hubei and Shenzhen
ETSs (Table 2).
3.2. Data collection and analysis
Our study began with a review of relevant policy documents and
other printed and online resources to understand the policy background
and progress of the Guangdong ETS. These include various im-
plementation and regulatory ‘notice’ (tōng zhī), ‘rules’ (xì zé), and ‘plan’
(fāng àn) issued by the People’s Government of Guangdong Province,
and consultancy and applied research reports, such as Wu et al. (2014)
and the Sun Yat-sen University’s Research Center for Climate Change of
Guangdong (2016). Carbon market information was also solicited.
The analysis is mainly based on a series of in-depth, semi-structured
interviews conducted in Guangzhou. Members of the research team
contacted and interviewed 18 individuals from 12 organizations to re-
cord their ﬁrst-hand experiences in dealing with relevant government
agencies and policy initiatives. The snowball sampling technique was
used to identify the ﬁrst batch of interviewees, starting with the existing
contacts of members of the research team and then their own contacts
who have relevant expertise or experience. Other interviewees were
identiﬁed from a web search and contacted by email. These individuals
are senior members of local businesses, social organizations, and re-
search institutes (Table 3). All of them actively engage in emission
trading and/or emission reduction in Guangzhou city and other jur-
isdictions within Guangdong Province. Their core business activities
range from applied research for policy development to consultancy and
trading services for regulated enterprises and other market participants.
The interviews were completed within a one-year period beginning
from March 2016. Each lasted for 45 to 90min.
Our search for informants did not include representatives of gov-
ernment and regulated enterprises, because the study primarily focused
on the experience of non-state actors in contributing to network func-
tioning. Also, scientiﬁc studies of state actors and climate governance in
China have previously been reported by others as well as ourselves
(Shen, 2015; blinded for review). It should be noted that whether or not
the regulated enterprises in China should be deﬁned as non-state actors
is contested, because most of those currently covered by the ETSs in
China are owned by the state, and their top leadership is transferred
from the public service system and appointed by the government.
Nonetheless, the interviewing processes revolved around the cur-
rent progress in various activities related to network functioning (e.g.
capacity building workshops, joint meetings), the role of our informants
and their interactions with government agencies and regulated en-
terprises in participating or organizing these activities, what govern-
ance issues their repeated interactions have exposed. It is noteworthy
that the 12 organizations have been working closely with both gov-
ernment agencies and enterprises. This means that they understand
how the governance network is shaped by state actors, but are not
bound to accepting their practices and preoccupations.
In analysing data, we used Andonova et al. (2009) framework with
modiﬁcations to recognize the speciﬁcs of our case study. We explore
opportunities for ‘actor engagement’, instead of ‘information sharing’.
Fig. 1. Cumulative trading volume of emission allowances under the seven pilot
emission trading schemes of China (up to 30 June 2017).
Source: IDEACARBON (ideacarbon.org/archives/36877). Updated 23 August
2017.
Fig. 2. Cumulative turnover of emission allowances under the seven pilot
emission trading schemes of China (up to 30 June 2017).
Source: IDEACARBON (ideacarbon.org/archives/36877). Updated 23 August
2017. The turnover estimates originally in Chinese yuan were converted to US
dollars at the rate of 6.64 (USD/CNY) based on the Federal Reverse’s exchange
rate records (2016).
Table 2









China Guangdong ETS 2.14 29.15 (2016)
Hubei ETS 2.22 13.56 (2016)
Beijing ETS 7.46 7.18 (2016)
Tianjin ETS 1.29 1.17 (2016)
Shanghai ETS 2.49 10.62 (2016)
Chongqing ETS 0.26 5.36 (2016)
Shenzhen ETS 4.26 4.83 (2016)
Fujian ETS 3.42 (2016)
European
Union
EU ETS 8.57 6,685.82(2015)
United States RGGI 4.35 240.74(2015)
California CaT 14.75 754.39(2015)
Canada Quebec CaT 14.75 Not available
Ontario CaT 14.88 Not available
Korea Korea ETS 18.53 Not available
Switzerland Swiss ETS 6.67 Not available
New Zealand NZ ETS 13.17 Not available
Sources:
a ICAP Quarterly - Global Trends in Emissions Trading, Issue 15, 18 October
2017. Available at https://icapcarbonaction.com/zh/newsletter-archive/
mailing/view/listid-/mailingid-66/listtype-1.
b China: IDEACARBON, available at ideacarbon.org/archives/36877, up-
dated 1 July 2017. EU and US: Carbon Markets 2015 data for NCSC, Bloomberg
New Energy Finance (January 2016).
c Notes: The trading volume estimates for the seven China’s piloting ETSs are
based on a one-year period from 30 June 2016 to 30 June 2017, which is a
complete compliance year in China’s carbon market, whereas those for the EU
ETS, RGGI and California CaT run from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015.
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Andonova et al.’s typology of governance networks was developed in a
transnational setting where state authorities are not unitary. Our case
study, however, focuses on a relatively small group of local actors based
in one Chinese province, whose core businesses are concentrated in a
handful of cities and local areas. The close proximity to each other and
the widespread use of information technology have overcome certain
technical barriers to the sharing of information among these actors.
Instead, the governance network could play a more important role in
diﬀusing new norms and engaging otherwise uninterested parties, no-
tably business managers, in low-carbon production practices. Such
norms and practices might include seeing emission reduction as an asset
rather than a liability, controlling the use of energy and emission of
GHGs, and participating in the trading of emission allowances or
credits. This speciﬁc function is implied in the framework advanced by
Andonova et al. (2009), who argue that:
Information sharing takes on a governance function when it is re-
cognized as authoritative and serves to direct constituents within
the network. This may take place through norm diﬀusion, consensus
building, or changing practices (Andonova et al., 2009, p. 64).
Our adaptation highlights the role of governance network in di-
recting its constituents. We put an emphasis on motivation and beha-
vioural drivers to make more explicit the distinction from the function
of capacity building. The case study presented below shows that the
governance network investigated, as it currently stands, is well placed
to achieve one end but not the other. Our adaptation can reveal a
clearer structure of network functioning at work.
Moreover, our case study involves a unitary state that is, to a large
extent, empowered to implement the policy concerned. As we show
below, the governing activities concerning implementation of rules and
policy measures related to the ETS are predominantly led by the state,
demonstrating a diﬀerent conﬁguration of authority from the rather
decentralized capacity building activities. We therefore discuss ‘im-
plementation’ separately from ‘capacity building’ and along with a
cognate function of governance network, i.e. ‘rule setting’, which is a
similarly top-down activity.
Thus, network functions are described in this paper in terms of ca-
pacity building, actor engagement, and rule setting and implementation.
These analytic categories cover a wider range of issues, such as policy
implementation and personnel training, that are particularly important
for a newly introduced and relatively novel domestic policy programme
(i.e. ETS in China) and repeatedly mentioned by the informants. The
following section describes these three aspects of the governance net-




The Guangdong ETS is said to be steered by an inclusive group of
actors, which is chaired by the Governor of Guangdong and includes
representatives of government agencies, research institutes and uni-
versities, enterprises and industry associations (Research Center for
Climate Change of Guangdong, 2016). The key actors involved in the
governance of this ETS and related issues (e.g. energy saving and clean
production) are indicated in Fig. 3. The Development and Reform
Commissions (DRCs) at three levels play diﬀerent roles. The top-tier
National DRC (hereafter, NDRC) is the macro-economic branch of the
State Council of China and charged with overseeing the eight pilot ETSs
and setting up the prospective national ETS. The Guangdong DRC holds
the portfolio of economic development and planning, and administers
the Guangdong ETS. Although the approval for setting up ETSs is
granted by the NDRC in a top-down fashion, provincial DRCs are given
Table 3
List of informants.
Type of aﬃliation Number of informants Position Portfolio (specialization)
Private company 4 Deputy Director Business Managers Trading services (emission rights)
1 Senior Energy Eﬃciency Assessor Measuring, Reporting and Veriﬁcation (MRV)
2 Chairman Engineer and lawyer Carbon asset management
1 Director Carbon asset management
Research institute 2 Director Deputy Director ETS design
1 Research team leader ETS design
1 Carbon trading specialist and auditor Carbon auditing and consultancy
Social organization 1 Deputy President Consultancy (low carbon business)
2 Deputy President Chief Engineer Consultancy (energy)
1 Secretary General Consultancy (clean production)
1 Deputy Secretary-General Consultancy (low carbon business)
1 Vice Secretary General Consultancy (clean production)
Fig. 3. Key parties involved in governing carbon market in Guangdong.
EIC: Economic & Information Commission of Guangdong Province; DEP: Department of Environmental Protection.
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a relatively high degree of autonomy in designing their own pilot ETSs
(Zhang et al., 2014; Zhang, 2015a, b). Municipal DRCs submit emission
data to provincial DRCs for determining the allocation of emission al-
lowances and are not the main driver of policy change.3
Guangdong’s climate policies gain legitimacy from the Guangdong
Leading Group Addressing Climate Change and Energy Eﬃciency. This
Leading Group was based in two separate units, i.e. the DRC and
Economic and Information Commission (EIC) of Guangdong until
August 2014, when the Group’s administration was transferred to the
DRC. Promotion of energy eﬃciency in the province falls within the
remit of the EIC. Guangdong’s Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP) supports clean production generally across the province. The
responsibilities for addressing climate change speciﬁcally go to the
Climate Division of Guangdong DRC. These institutional arrangements
result in the DRC playing a mixed role as both an economic and en-
vironmental manager (Lo and Yu, 2015), and fragmentation in the
governance of climate change and related issues in the province (Wu
et al., 2014), as we further discuss later.
Members of the epistemic communities include university-based
research institutes and oﬃcial think tanks. Sat Yat-sen University
(SYSU) is the most prominent higher education institution in
Guangdong. In partnership with, and with funding from, the Provincial
DRC, the SYSU set up the Research Center for Climate Change (RCCC)
in 2015, which plays a principal role in advising the DRC on ETS design
and creating an emission data inventory for the province. Oﬃcial think
tanks in China, such as the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, are established by government.
Like universities, they advise government departments on the scientiﬁc
and technical aspects of public policy, but are generally more depen-
dent on the state, both ﬁnancially and institutionally. These epistemic
institutions act as the technical arm of government.
The role of social organizations in climate governance in China is
rarely explored (see, however, Francesch-Huidobro and Mai (2012).
Their formation is a product of the state’s retreat from a planned
economy. Since the late 1970s, a variety of voluntary associations and
NGOs have sprung up in China to provide various social welfare ser-
vices that previously fell in state hands (Ho, 2007). Some of them
specialize in environmental protection and energy saving, such as the
Guangdong Energy Conservation Association. At odds with the “Wes-
tern concept of voluntary associations and NGOs that can protect citi-
zens’ rights or counterbalance state power” (Ho, 2007, p. 192), social
organizations in China substitute the state in the area of service pro-
vision and act in the space between the state and the society. They have
access to state institutions and are sometimes oﬀered opportunities for
providing policy inputs and negotiating greater rights to pursue orga-
nizational interests and goals (Wu, 2003). Industry associations are led
by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and serve to protect members’ in-
terests, rather than providing social welfare or professional environ-
mental services. Currently, four energy-intensive industries are covered
by the Guangdong ETS, namely, energy, iron and steel, cement, and
petrochemicals.
Enterprises require business and technical support for managing the
costs and time required for compliance with ETS requirements. The
former group includes exchanges and carbon asset management and
consultancy ﬁrms. Environment or carbon exchanges, such as the
Guangzhou China Emissions Exchange, provide essential support to the
development of carbon market infrastructure and trading platforms.
Carbon asset management ﬁrms advise businesses and help them
manage their allocated emission allowances or develop emission re-
duction projects aimed at producing carbon credits and creating new
revenue streams.
Technical service providers include quality control and certiﬁcation
agencies, such as the China Quality Certiﬁcation Centre, Canton Branch
(a service organization managed as a SOE) and the China Electronic
Product Reliability and Environmental Testing Research Institute
(commonly known as CEPREI) Certiﬁcation Body (a SOE). They assist
businesses and government in measuring GHG emissions and verifying
emission reductions, and play an instrumental role in building capacity
and formulating carbon auditing standards and guidelines for the DRCs.
In Guangdong, representatives of exchanges and certiﬁcation agencies
serve on several expert panels organized by the DRC and related to
carbon market development and the ETS. These companies, together
with research institutes and enterprises, have a strong presence in two
highly active technical committees advising the Guangdong DRC,
namely, the Committee of Allowance Allocation Review and the
Technical Assessment Panel of Industry Allowance (Research Center for
Climate Change of Guangdong, 2016).
As described above, a group of non-state actors is well connected to
state institutions. They take part in the process of ETS policy formula-
tion and implementation in Guangdong, and frequently communicate
and collaborate with each other in this process. Through the deep en-
gagement in the governance of Guangdong ETS, they have discerned a
number of problems and challenges that could preclude the governance
network from meeting its goals. We found some consensus among our
informants, mainly about the current state of carbon market in China.
Fewer of them expressed similar views about governance or related
issues, due to their diﬀerent experiences and attitudes. This is discussed
in the following three sub-sections.
4.2. Capacity building
In Guangdong, network contacts have provided favourable condi-
tions for capacity building, which is essential to enabling action.
Despite their peripheral role in the making of key decisions and the
inherent diﬃculties in motivating businesses, non-state actors are able
to utilize their own expertise and extensive connections to strengthen
the capabilities of enterprise managers, government oﬃcials, and de-
velopers of emission reduction projects, and other interested parties.
Both social organizations and service providers have organized
various training workshops, sharing sessions, or other forms of capacity
building activity over the past three years. Many of them are also in-
volved in sharing sessions and industry conferences that are open to
national audience. The Guangzhou China Emissions Exchange, for ex-
ample, is the key player in Guangdong, hosting 14 training workshops
on emission trading in 2016. These workshops and activities equip
participants with relevant skills and knowledge about the general
policy context, the mechanisms of allowance allocation, management
rules and regulatory restrictions, trading procedures and account
management, and the requirements of project development and regis-
tration, etc. Most of these training activities attract incomes.
The imperative of developing capacity beneﬁts from the network
comprising state and non-state actors. Core service providers are able to
help practitioners develop capacity because of their prior experience in
working with related mechanisms (e.g. Clean Development
Mechanism), relevant skillsets (e.g. carbon / energy auditing), or ex-
tended period of research and training. Some of them are ‘designated’
training agents, being invited by a DRC to oﬀer training sessions for
local governments, particularly those in poorer provinces, such as
Guangxi and Jiangxi (Research Center for Climate Change of
Guangdong, 2016):
Their [local governments’] capacity is low and they require training
and exchange. Guangdong Province wants to be become the
[emission training] training centre in South China. Many provinces
will come to learn about emission trading and exchange. (interview
with technical service provider, March 2016).
Oﬃcials of these local governments are usually called upon by the
NDRC or their local counterparts, indicating the importance of this
3 - except Shenzhen, which is a municipality and its ETS is administered by the
Municipal DRC of Shenzhen, instead of the Guangdong DRC.
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central network ‘node’ in legitimizing coordinating initiatives. The
strong inﬂuence of these DRCs, notably NDRC, is also instrumental to
mobilizing enterprises managers: “in the early days, enterprises were
pressured by the government and had no choice but sending their people to us
for training” (interview on with a service provider, March 2016). Although
DRCs continue to call for training and mobilize oﬃcials and enterprise
managers, service providers have increasingly become a network node,
more actively promoting their fee-paying training workshops and pro-
fessional services. Service providers partially substitute the state by
delivering capacity building services to meet demands created by the
latter.
Regular collaborations exist among network constituents. The lack
of in-house expertise within DRCs (including the Guangdong DRC)
themselves has provided conditions for the network to contribute and
develop mutual trust. For instance, the panel speakers of the training
workshops organized by exchanges always include other network
constituents, such as research institutes, consultancy ﬁrms, ﬁnancial
institutions, and other service providers. Such collaborations are re-
ciprocal; representatives of exchanges are often invited to speak in si-
milar training activities hosted by other network constituents. While
service providers deliver training services for a wide range of in-
dividuals, some research institutes are more ‘institutionalized’. The
most notable example is the SYSU’s RCCC. The Climate Division of the
Guangdong DRC currently (early 2017) consists of only six staﬀ mem-
bers. On the DRC’s invitation, some of the RCCC’s researchers are based
in the oﬃce of Climate Division for an extended period of time and
work very closely with DRC oﬃcials. They do not only provide advice
on policy design and operation, but also contribute to the transfer of
professional knowledge and skills.
Unlike their counterparts in Europe, carbon exchanges in China
have little collaboration with conventional environmental NGOs. Yet,
social organizations oﬀered many forms of training and capacity
building services, covering emission trading as well as carbon auditing
and energy conservation. These initiatives are one of the main income
sources of the smaller social organizations. A representative of a social
organization indicated that the government’s eﬀorts on capacity
building are far from adequate and they ﬁll the gap by providing
training services, making room for some 200 social organizations spe-
cializing in low-carbon development and energy conservation to exist in
just one province (Guangdong). Comparing with research institutes and
exchanges, these social organizations provide a more ﬂexible mix of
training services and focus on speciﬁc industries or themes, depending
on their organizational goals and strengths. Collaborations among
network constituents also exist in delivering these services.
In the area of capacity building, the network can be considered as
properly functioning. It helps coordinate the transfer of knowledge and
skills, and the tendencies for state domination in this process are de-
clining. As the collaborative approach can reduce the costs of capacity
development by virtue of specialization, there are an increasing number
of such initiatives across China as many local governments and en-
terprises from other provinces embark on the preparation for the na-
tional ETS.
4.3. Actor engagement
Non-state actors could contribute to the governance network by
motivating other actors, notably businesses, to participate in emission
trading. Whereas the state assumes leadership in rule setting and im-
plementation, social organizations and service providers (e.g. ex-
changes) help achieve the network goal by coordinating various public
and private activities for introducing the idea of emission trading and
the role of carbon markets to enterprises. Diﬃculties are found not
mainly in informing enterprise managers, but in creating a normative
environment for participation. The problem arises from the lack of in-
centives, which is beyond the ability of the network and its participants
to ﬁx, except the state. The ETS is adopted and implemented in a top-
down fashion, and most of the regulated enterprises are forced to re-
spond and make adjustment.
At the early stages of implementation, many regulated enterprises,
notably the larger ones, were reluctant to cooperate (although they
could not refuse due to the strong inﬂuence by the state). Changes in
corporate practice were incremental. As the authority of decision-
making asymmetrically rests upon the state, the coordinating eﬀorts
made by social organizations and service providers are eﬀective only
within a limited range. A barrier to coordination, particularly at the
early stages, is the lack of understanding:
The main barrier is lack of understanding. Initially, enterprises re-
fused to cooperate, as the imperatives of energy conservation and
environmental protection have already put them under great pres-
sures, and there is yet another one [i.e. emission reduction]. (in-
terview with research institute, May 2016).
Enterprises do not have an adequate understanding of the policy.
Their professional practice, willingness to cooperate, and facilities
and measurements are all falling short of requirement. (interview
with technical service provider, March 2016).
All parties recognized the need for training and capacity building.
The problem is that the main driver of business motivation is ill-con-
structed. During the ﬁrst few years of policy implementation, there was
a sense of forced consciousness:
I think it was a forced response at the beginning, or some kind of
coercive learning. (interview with business service provider, March
2016).
I believe that most enterprises do not fully understand. It is a gov-
ernment mandate to participate in [emission] trading. As it is
mandatory, enterprises simply follow the rules and do not oﬀer any
informed advice; they do not see themselves a specialist (interview
with social organization, May 2016).
Although the state continues to compel enterprises to respond,
business reluctance is declining and awareness is increasing - a passive
response to the reality of a top-down policy change. Many large SOEs,
such as the China Huaneng Group Corporation, have set up new de-
partments or subsidiaries to manage their emission allowances and the
mix of carbon assets. Even the smaller ones have come to realize that
controlling their GHG emissions has become an imperative and the
failure to do this will threaten their survival. However, the slowly rising
interest in trading is driven by market more than state factors.
Corporate interest in trading depends on ‘market openness’, and
business awareness is a product of a cost-beneﬁt calculation:
Enterprises do not participate in emission trading simply because of
awareness. It depends on their own business conditions and cost
considerations. (interview with social organization, May 2016).
While business conditions vary, cost considerations are relative to
beneﬁts, or potential gains from trading in the market. Price signals
oﬀer a basis for cost-beneﬁt calculation, and this is where the main
problem lies. The Chinese carbon markets are currently far from com-
petitive and the trade prices of emission allowances do not reﬂect the
marginal costs of emission abatement (Lo, 2016; Munnings et al., 2016;
Zhao et al., 2016). According to Munnings et al. (2016), market li-
quidity in three pilot ETS sites, including Guangdong, is quite low. They
believe that “local governments and exchanges may play a strong role
in orchestrating trades – including determining the buyer, seller, and
transaction price of some transaction” (Munnings et al., 2016), p. 696).
This is concurred by one of our informants: “the current price is not a
market price, but determined by the government” (interview with service
provider, March 2016). We found that this and other informants have a
good understanding about market principles and in what aspects the
current system falls behind.
The low carbon prices create a poor market signal. High price levels
can attract investments in the development of low-carbon technologies
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and emission reduction projects that can generate carbon credits, and
encourage the trading of emission allowances to hedge risks, whereas
low price levels mean that these investments are not likely to yield high
returns and the best strategy would be purchasing cheap allowances or
credits to fulﬁl compliance requirements. The extended period of low
price levels in Guangdong’s carbon market renders the prospect for
break-even unclear. Also, ﬁnancial institutions are cautious of creating
new products linked with the ETS and investors lack conﬁdence in the
market, due to the lingering uncertainties associated with policy change
(Wu et al., 2014; Lo and Yu, 2015; Lo, 2015a). The barely competitive
market environment reduces incentives for making investment and
participating in allowance trading. Coordinating eﬀorts made by other
network constituents are not as eﬀective as expected.
The network function of motivating businesses is aﬀected by the
ways in which the carbon market is steered. Coercive means were used
by the government to drive early action, but sustained eﬀorts on the
part of enterprises depend on price signals and economic incentives.
Since the carbon market conditions are created and shaped by a policy
programme crafted by state institutions, and non-state actors play
merely an advisor role, altering the incentive structure is beyond the
ability of network constituents other than the state itself. This suggests
that the key barrier is largely exogenous to the network structure.
Although the governance network is able to share information and
build capacity, it has achieved a modest success in motivating busi-
nesses. One of the main drivers of motivation falls outside the network.
4.4. Rule setting and implementation
Non-state actors have expressed concerns about network coordina-
tion in the process of policy formulation and implementation. The op-
eration of the Guangdong ETS cuts across two interrelated policy areas,
i.e. climate change, and energy eﬃciency and emission reduction.
These policy areas, however, are administered by two separate
‘Working Groups’ that are hosted by two departments, i.e. DRC (for
climate change and ETS) and EIC (for energy eﬃciency and emission
reduction). This institutional arrangement creates confusion and com-
plexities in liaison, reporting, and collaboration. Interestingly, there is
some conﬁdence in state leadership and the centralized system, despite
the tendencies for administrative decentralization across China. Both
factors could pose a challenge to the emergence of an advanced form of
network governance.
The poor coordination of responsibilities can impede communica-
tion and collaboration among existing and potential network con-
stituents. When responding to our questions about ETS and (carbon)
emission reduction, a representative of a social organization repeatedly
pointed out our (alleged) confusion between the two, implying that
they fall into two diﬀerent domains. A specialist in environmental
technologies and processes, he contended that the Provincial DRC is
one part of it (governance), the EIC is another one, and the DEP is yet
another one. This requires specialist organisations to put in diverted
resources when initiating collaboration with diﬀerent streams of pro-
vincial governing. Although he and his colleagues collaborate with the
EIC and the DEP on a regular basis, they have not established strong
links with the DRC that would allow them to represent the environ-
mental sector. It is then not surprising that most other informants failed
to name any environmental NGO (not being a social organization) ac-
tively engaging in ETS policy development. This comes into contrast
with international studies showing that such NGOs are often a core
member of climate governance networks (e.g.Tosun and Schoenefeld,
2017). As the Provincial DRC does not assume formal responsibilities
for environmental protection and energy eﬃciency, enterprises and
service providers have to liaise and build linkages with multiple
agencies when responding to the demands of emission trading. These
communication channels are not always eﬀective (Arnstein, 1969). As a
group of close observers have indicated:
the [Guangdong] government uses a one-way method to commu-
nicate with other stakeholders, even with direct executive agencies,
resulting in a deviation of policy implementation and limited co-
operation among all the stakeholders. No oﬃcial channels for
feedback or questions are provided.” (Wu et al., 2014, p.23).
As a consequence, the transaction costs involved in compliance and
service provision might increase, compromising the eﬃciency of the
system.
A more important issue is that this arrangement results in regulatory
duplication. To implement the ETS and enforce binding emission re-
duction targets, the DRC has to monitor and manage GHGs emitted by
regulated enterprises. However, such a direct intervention into business
operation has always been overseen by the EIC. Under the ETS, the
authority of the DRC is extended and overlaps with that of the EIC.
Despite their overlapping responsibilities and services, these two
agencies do not work closely with each other nor seek formal clar-
iﬁcations. One informant described this situation as ‘double-headed
supervision’, a source of confusion on the part of enterprise managers.
Representatives of another service provider used exactly the same term
to describe a similar issue they have encountered. Despite working for a
private company, they found themselves reporting to two levels of
government, i.e. the Provincial DRC and the Municipal Government of
Guangzhou. This is because the Municipal Government is the main
shareholder of their parent company and oversees organizational mat-
ters, but the Provincial DRC administers the ETS and sets up the carbon
market in which they are deeply involved. This critical service provider
has to deal with two diﬀerent sources of authority, both of which have a
say on its product and service mixes as well as daily operation.
Nonetheless, this is seen as a double-edged sword. Suggested ad-
vantages of having two lines of reporting for service providers include
greater access to resources and closer linkages with the centre of au-
thority, providing legitimacy and convenience to service delivery and
product development.
While there is general support to decentralizing governance and
using market mechanisms for mitigating GHG emissions, the possibility
– or perhaps, reality – of fragmentation is an issue of concern. Looking
beyond Guangdong, the implementation of pilot ETSs has exposed
various problems associated with central-local relations, conﬂict of in-
terests and responsibilities between NDRC and other commissions and
ministries, such as the China Securities Regulatory Commission over-
seeing the ﬁnancial regulation of carbon markets, and the one-way
communication between government and other stakeholders (Qi and
Cheng, 2015; Wu et al., 2014). This has led one of the non-state actors
from the private sector to applaud the top-down approach. Recognizing
the importance of cross-sectoral collaboration and discussion among
stakeholders and policy-makers, he nonetheless believed that dele-
gating the authority of decision-making and creating binding rules to a
small number of state actors (e.g. NDRC or Provincial DRCs) is ad-
vantageous to system functioning.
We might struggle for three to ﬁve years, but take only one year to
roll it out. This is our so-called ‘democratic centralization’. You are
allowed to discuss, but after that, [the government] will act quickly.
This is the advantage of a centralized regime. (interview with business
service provider, July 2016).
A similar response from ﬁnancial institutions in China is reported by
Lo and Yu (2015), indicating a preference for state leadership and
control in ETS policy development. The hierarchical mode of steering is
seen as necessary for avoiding administrative failures at the lower levels
of government and compatible with the use of market mechanisms. For
service providers, it also ensures certainty of implementation when
rolling out new policies and operational mechanism.
In Guangdong, as in other piloting locations, the implementation
and regulation of ETS are dominated by state institutions. Among net-
work constituents, there is some frustration at governance
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fragmentation and partial conﬁdence in the productive elements of the
state-led approach. These beliefs could potentially undermine the case
for power sharing and displacing hierarchical approaches.
5. Discussion
Cap-and-trade systems put market principles at the forefront of
policy development and enable a wider range of actors to contribute.
The implementation of these systems in China would be meaningful and
important to the extent in which they restructure the governing re-
lationships between public and private actors and create conditions for
eﬀective governance - and ideally, networked forms of governance. In
China, the transition from government to governance has exposed nu-
merous tensions across all areas of public policy, including climate
change and energy (Cheung et al., 2017; Lo and Howes, 2015; Mai and
Francesch-Huidobro, 2015; Schreurs, 2017; Schröder, 2011; Tao and
Mah, 2009). These tensions might preclude advanced modes of gov-
ernance from emerging.
Situated in this context, our study attempted to assess the key
functions of a governance network in China. We examined the tensions
arising from the governance of the pilot ETS and carbon market in
Guangdong Province. The analytical framework developed by
Andonova et al. (2009) was adapted and used to ascertain the extent to
which, and in what aspects, the public network supporting GHG
emission reduction activities in Guangdong has performed its key
functions. The analysis focused on three aspects of network functioning,
namely, capacity building, actor engagement, and rule setting and
implementation.
The governing regime in Guangdong is marked by a relatively more
liberal approach that is open to a range of non-state actors, who are able
to form an advocacy coalition in the arena of climate policy generally
(Francesch-Huidobro and Mai, 2012). Collaborative, bottom-up in-
itiatives are most common in the diﬀusion of knowledge and skills
through professional training activities and sharing sessions. There is
some evidence on mutual learning, a requirement of network govern-
ance (Tosun and Schoenefeld, 2017). Some of the capacity building
arrangements are manifest as a partial substitute for government
(Parker, 2007). These opportunities arise from the lack of expertise
within the DRCs and enterprises, creating demand for collaboration
with other actors and network coordination. Yet, it is essentially a form
of cognitive engagement, restricted to the transmission of action-en-
abling expertise and learning from the best practice. In deﬁning an ideal
case of network function, Andonova et al. (2009, p. 64) suggest that
capacity building “is a process entangled with negotiation over rights
and responsibilities and struggles over the nature of the problem and its
appropriate solutions”. In Guangdong, although there is critical re-
ﬂection upon technical issues, capacity building activities do not pursue
a process of negotiation and problem deﬁnition.
More generally, the governing system has demonstrated only a
modest form of reﬂexive orientation. According to Jessop (2002), net-
work process is based on ‘reﬂexive rationality’, which requires attempts
to negotiate and steer the process of decision-making, leading to
common worldviews among actors and coordinated solutions (see also
Parker, 2007). In a similar vein, Bulkeley et al. (2016, p. 5) argue that
climate governance takes place through the “problematisation of par-
ticular entities”, such as energy systems. In our case study, such entities
include the environmental policy-making institutions that have adopted
top-down, command-and-control approaches. Corroborating earlier
reports (e.g. Qi and Cheng, 2015; Lo and Yu, 2015; Shen, 2015), net-
work constituents ﬁnd diﬃculties in motivating enterprises to partici-
pate in emission trading and make investment in carbon asset man-
agement. The low levels of carbon price, which stem from a series of
conservative policy interventions (e.g. restrictions on trading options
and price movements), are suggested to be the key reason.
Here, the problem is linked back to the hierarchical power relations
that privilege state control and contribute to market distortion, trig-
gering attempts to reﬂect upon the nature of a market mechanism and
the very reason for creating one in China, i.e. displacing the command-
and-control approaches. Nevertheless, this problematique is a dis-
cursive one, as the conventional practice is highly resilient and con-
sidered to be productive in some aspects. Displacing state control would
be unrealistic.
In the area of implementation and regulation, network functioning
has a lot to improve. Some non-state actors, such as service providers
and researchers, are included in the decision-making process in the
capacity of panel experts. Other non-state actors, such as social orga-
nizations, play a modest supporting role outside the centre of power,
whereas environmental NGOs are absent. The limited involvement of
environmental NGOs in this process can be explained by the tight ad-
ministrative controls imposed on them and their relatively short history
in shaping policies and politics in the socialist regime of China. The ﬁrst
environmental NGO in China was established in 1994, and subse-
quently similar organizational forms were given ‘favorable political
opportunities’ and ‘indigenous organizational strength’ to ‘organize and
participate in civic action’ while sometimes also to ‘test political limits’
(Ru and Ortolano, 2009; Yang, 2005). With strong government spon-
sorship, an increasing number of environmental NGOs have recently
developed a low carbon portfolio. Many of them are ‘government or-
ganized’ NGOs, or so-called ‘GONGO’ (Wu, 2003), that run awareness
raising and capacity building activities in partnership with industries
and deliver technical services to them. These organizations tend to
operate within political boundaries prescribed by or acceptable to the
state. Thus, the authority of decision-making is concentrated in state
institutions, and the ways in which they govern cross-sectoral issues,
such as the ETS, have demonstrated some degree of fragmentation.
However, it is not clear that these concerns have evolved into a strong
transformative impulse.
An international study presented by Paterson et al. (2014) has
shown that the governance of emission trading systems tends to be a
polycentric one, with multiple loci of governance and without a coer-
cive power forcing a particular way to do emission trading. However,
most of the emission trading systems analysed by Paterson et al. (2014)
exist in an international or cross-regional policy venue, whereas the
Guangdong ETS is restricted to one province. The governing regime in
Guangdong is legitimized by a political mandate from the central
government and managed by the Provincial DRC. There is a clear
structure of hierarchy, particularly in rule setting and implementation
processes. The introduction of the market mechanism constitutes a
small turnaround in practice, and conditions for polycentric governance
remain premature. Government mandates continue to play a central
role in setting up and sustaining the carbon market. For example, if
local enterprises are not put under pressure by a powerful DRC, they
will have low motivation to cooperate and engage in emission trading
in meaningful ways. Delays in rolling out, or even reversals of, key
policy measures might also eventuate.
Therefore, despite their understanding and belief in market princi-
ples, some network constituents did not categorically reject the con-
ventional, top-down practice. The corporate participants of ETS gen-
erally accepted that the price signals of carbon credits be regulated by
the state. The implicit, passive support to hierarchical modes of steering
could potentially undermine the conditions for networked forms of
governance to develop. What is obvious, however, is that the climate
change governance system in China is in a transition process. While
network governance is in its infancy, multi-level governance appear to
have gained some momentum. Both the pilot ETSs and previously the
CDM involve a transfer of some responsibilities, resources and power
from central authorities to municipal and provincial governments as
well as industries (Schröder, 2011; Schreurs, 2017). Movement of non-
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state actors across scale has also become more frequent. For example,
some of our informants, who are aﬃliated with provincial non-state
institutions, have been recruited as expert panel members to participate
and contribute to the ongoing decision-making process in Beijing in the
lead-up to the launch of the national ETS. Whether or not such in-
itiatives will strengthen the case for networked forms of governance,
despite the barriers identiﬁed above, is a question for future research.
6. Conclusions
In this article we explore issues about governing domestic cap-and-
trade systems for mitigating carbon emissions. We identify key chal-
lenges presented by an emerging network supporting carbon market
development in Guangdong Province. Evidence from this study suggests
that the governance network supporting the Guangdong ETS and
carbon market, in its present form, remains underdeveloped. Although
it has demonstrated some of the key network functions, mainly capacity
building, more could be done to strengthen engagement and enable
power sharing in steering and coordinating the decision-making pro-
cess.
We echo Parker (2007) call for making a distinction between ‘net-
worked governance’ and ‘network’. A loosely structured network has
emerged from the accelerated process of establishing the ETS and de-
veloping the carbon market in Guangdong. It coordinates capacity
building activities and can be seen as a partial substitute for the state in
this area. However, the key features of reﬂexivity and power sharing in
decision-making and steering are not clearly represented. These ﬁnd-
ings also call into question the dichotomous view that governance
through markets should be seen as a non-hierarchical one (Pattberg and
Stripple, 2008). Such a governance mode may retain hierarchical ele-
ments, particularly when a system is in transition to another form in
which the system operator has little successful prior experience. That
being said, much is yet to be seen, as the national ETS of China has not
gained a clear shape and might present more complexities than the pilot
schemes have displayed.
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